Model checking reveals design issues leading to spurious actuation of nuclear instrumentation and control systems by Pakonen, Antti et al.
This document is downloaded from the




P.O. box 1000FI-02044 VTT
Finland
By using VTT’s Research Information Portal you are bound by the
following Terms & Conditions.
I have read and I understand the following statement:
This document is protected by copyright and other intellectual
property rights, and duplication or sale of all or part of any of this
document is not permitted, except duplication for research use or
educational purposes in electronic or print form. You must obtain
permission for any other use. Electronic or print copies may not be
offered for sale.
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland
Model checking reveals design issues leading to spurious actuation of
nuclear instrumentation and control systems
Pakonen, Antti; Buzhinsky, Igor; Björkman, Kim
Published in:









Please cite the original version:
Pakonen, A., Buzhinsky, I., & Björkman, K. (2021). Model checking reveals design issues leading to spurious
actuation of nuclear instrumentation and control systems. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 205,
[107237]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2020.107237
Download date: 19. Dec. 2021
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Reliability Engineering and System Safety 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ress 
Model checking reveals design issues leading to spurious actuation of 
nuclear instrumentation and control systems☆ 
Antti Pakonen⁎,a, I Buzhinskyb,c, K Björkmana 
a VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd., P.O. Box 1000, FI-02044 VTT, Finland 
b Department of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Aalto University, P.O. Box 11000, FI-00076 Aalto, Finland 
c Computer Technologies Laboratory, ITMO University, 197101 St. Petersburg, Russia  





Model-based system engineering 
A B S T R A C T   
A spurious actuation of an industrial instrumentation and control (I&C) system is a failure mode where the 
system or its component inadvertently produces an operation without a justified reason to do so. Design issues 
leading to spurious failures are difficult to analyse, but pose a high risk for safety. Model checking is a formal 
verification method that can be used for exhaustive analysis of I&C systems. In this paper, we explain how formal 
properties that address spurious failures can be specified, and how model checking can then be used to verify 
I&C application logic designs based on vendor-specific function block diagrams. Based on over ten years of 
successful practical projects in the Finnish nuclear industry, we present 21 real-world design issues (representing 
37% of all detected issues), each involving a systemic failure that could lead to spurious actuation of nuclear 
safety I&C. We then describe how random failures of the underlying hardware architecture—another cause for 
spurious actuation—can also be included in the models. With an experimental evaluation based on real-world 
nuclear industry models, we demonstrate that our method can be effectively used for the verification of single 
failure tolerance.   
1. Introduction 
Spurious actuation is defined as a failure mode where an actuation 
of an instrumentation and control (I&C) system function occurs without 
a real demand [1]. The terms “inadvertent operation” or “active 
failure” [2] are also used. (In contrast, “passive failure” [2] means that 
the system fails to produce the required response.) In a nuclear power 
plant, a spurious failure can limit the ability of safety systems to 
function properly, and challenge the safety of the plant [3]. Nuclear 
regulatory bodies agree that spurious actuation is a particular safety 
concern [4], and that safety of systems “cannot be discussed and shown 
to exist” without considering unintended behaviour of both hardware 
and software [5]. 
Active failures can be further divided into random and systematic 
failures [2]. Random failures [6] can occur at any time, and the prob-
ability of their occurrence can increase due to aging of hardware 
components. Systematic failures [6], on the other hand, are determi-
nistically related to a cause that can be eliminated by a modification of 
the design, e.g., a software design error. 
By their nature, spurious failures are more complex to analyse than 
passive failures [1]. It is more straightforward to think of test cases for 
the intended functionality. Spurious failures are also a multidisciplinary 
issue, as the failure can be caused by any component between the 
process measurement sensors and the actuators [1], but also by support 
systems (power supply, cooling), environmental effects, human actions, 
or plant transients [3]. 
One of the safety design principles in nuclear power plants (NPPs) is 
defence-in-depth—establishment of several successive physical barriers 
for containing accidents. Still, spurious actuation of a safety I&C system 
is a hazard that can potentially challenge more than one barrier si-
multaneously [7]. As more complex I&C architectures are more difficult 
to design and verify, adding numerous defence-in-depth levels can ac-
tually increase the risk of spurious actuation [2]. 
Another NPP design principle that can be used to deal with spurious 
actuation from random failure is redundancy–adding redundant sub-
systems, and voting on control actions. Together, the subsystems are 
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then capable of performing the desired tasks even if any single com-
ponent in them fails. The same solution is also used for safety critical 
applications in, e.g., aviation [8,9], aerospace [10–12], railway  [13], 
or automotive  [14] industries. Further failure tolerance is achieved 
with diversity—by using different technologies or design principles in 
redundant back-up systems. 
Nevertheless, aside from emphasizing good design principles like 
defence-in-depth, single failure tolerance, quality, independence and 
qualification [7], the challenge remains: How to ensure that I&C sys-
tems do not contain design issues that might lead to spurious actuation? 
Modern I&C systems are so complex in terms of both hardware and 
software (platform and application) that 100% test coverage is practi-
cally impossible. The risk of systemic failure remains. 
Model checking [15] is a formal verification method where a stated 
formal property of a system is verified through exhaustive exploration 
of all the reachable states of a model of that system. It is a proven 
method for exhaustive verification of a nuclear I&C system’s application 
logic, regardless of whether the logic is implemented with program-
mable logic controller (PLC) software or field-programmable gate array 
(FPGA) configuration [16]. Since the formal properties can also address 
unwanted behaviour, the method can also be used to identify systemic 
failures leading to spurious actuation. However, the focus is often on 
the logic specification (e.g., a function block diagram), alone. In reality, 
the application logic operates on hardware components subject to 
random failure. Verifying that the system and the intended function-
ality are also fault tolerant calls for modelling of both the application 
logic and the failure modes of the underlying hardware architecture, in 
unison. 
This paper is an extended version of [17], and includes a practical 
evaluation of ideas presented in [18]. The contribution is fourfold. First, 
we discuss the types of formal properties needed for analysing spurious 
actuation, the relationships between them, and the challenges in their 
formalisation. Second, we introduce a modelling approach and a 
practical tool for verifying I&C application logics, and discuss their 
inherent limitations. Third, we present data and discuss the character-
istics of the 21 design issues VTT1 has revealed in practical nuclear 
industry projects, each example involving a scenario where the appli-
cation logic design causes a spurious actuation. Fourth, we show how 
the application logic model can be supplemented with hardware fail-
ures, and demonstrate using real-world nuclear industry models that 
the modelling method can effectively be used to verify single failure 
tolerance. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we in-
troduce the basics of model checking, and discuss the use of temporal 
logic languages for specifying formal properties that deal with spurious 
actuation. In Section 3, we describe an example of a fault-tolerant, four- 
redundant nuclear I&C safety system, and describe how a graphical 
frontend for the NuSMV [19] model checker—called MOD-
CHK—processes nuclear industry specific aspects of application logics. 
We then list design issues revealed in practical customer projects, and 
include a real example. In Section 4, we describe a method for mod-
elling failures of the underlying I&C hardware components, and then 
evaluate the method–again using real nuclear industry application logic 
models. We analyse related research in Section 5, discuss our results in  
Section 6, and present our conclusions in Section 7. 
2. Formal verification 
2.1. Model checking 
Model checking [15] is a formal verification method where a soft-
ware tool called a model checker is used to specify a formal model and 
analyse whether a desired property holds for it through exhaustive 
exploration of all its reachable states. The desired properties are for-
malised using temporal logic languages like Linear Temporal Logic 
(LTL), Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [15] or Property Specification 
Language (PSL) [20]. If an execution path that violates the property is 
found, it is returned to the user as a counterexample scenario, possibly 
revealing a design issue. 
Formally, the model of the system is a Kripke structure, a tuple 
S S T L( , , , AP, ),0 where S is a set of states, S0⊆S is a set of initial states, 
T⊆S × S is the transition relation, AP is a set of atomic propositions, 
and L S: 2AP is a labeling function. In addition, we assume that the 
model has a number of Boolean or integer state variables such that each 
state corresponds to a unique assignment of these variables. In this case 
atomic propositions can be thought of as either Boolean variables or 
bits of integer variables, and the labeling function essentially returns 
the assignment of variables to a state. An execution path (or, simply, a 
path) of a model is a finite or infinite sequence …s s( , , )0 1 such that 
s0 ∈ S0 and +s s T( , )i i 1 for all i ≥ 0. A state s ∈ S is reachable if it 
belongs to some path. Below, speaking of a state space, we will mean 
the set of reachable states. 
A fundamental challenge in model checking is to avoid state space 
explosion, where the number of model states to enumerate through 
becomes enormous [15]. Symbolic model checkers—like the popular 
open source tool NuSMV [19]—employ Binary Decision Diagrams 
(BDD), which provide a canonical representation for Boolean formulae. 
BDD processing allows avoiding explicit state enumeration [21]. An-
other solution to make the analysis faster is to use Boolean (or propo-
sitional) satisfiability (SAT) solvers to perform bounded model checking 
(BMC), where the allowed length of checked state transition sequences 
is limited [22]. SAT solvers are also used to check whether a Boolean 
formula holds in all reachable states with inductive methods [23]. 
NuSMV is based on synchronous processing of model components 
over discrete time, where time corresponds to the number of executed 
transitions, but continuous model checkers are also available (e.g., 
UPPAAL [24]), as well as tools like HyComp [25] for hybrid systems. 
2.2. Formal property specification 
Most (but not all) formal properties can be cast into one of two 
types: safety properties dictate that something shall not happen, and 
liveness properties dictate that something shall eventually happen [26]. 
More formally, a finite execution cannot violate a liveness property–a 
counterexample must be lasso-shaped [15] (with a loop at the end), 
instead. Conversely, an execution path that violates a safety property 
can always be truncated to a finite one, and there is an identifiable time 
step where the undesired state occurs. Therefore, the properties that are 
specifically written to prove the absence of spurious actuation are safety 
properties. 
Temporal logic languages provide a formalism to formulate state-
ments over execution paths, not just individual states [15] (typically, 
only infinite execution paths are considered). For this purpose, LTL and 
CTL utilize so-called temporal operators in addition to Boolean con-
nectives. The following temporal operators are defined in LTL (using 
notation from [15]):  
• X p: p is true in the next state of the path (“neXt”).  
• G p: p is true at every state on the path (“Globally”).  
• F p: p is true at some future state on the path (“Finally”).  
• Up q: q is true at some future state, and at every preceding state on 
the path, p is true (“Until”). 
In the above expressions, p and q can be Boolean statements over 
state variables as well as nested temporal formulae. 
In addition to describing future behaviour, being able to refer to 
past states is often convenient. Past LTL operators, as suggested in, 
e.g., [27], include: 
1 VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd. is a state owned company 
providing research and innovation services. https://www.vttresearch.com/. 
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• Y p: p holds in the previous state on the path. Y p is false in the 
initial state (“Yesterday”).  
• Z p is equivalent to Y p, except that it is true in the initial state.  
• H p: p is true at every preceding (and the current) state on the path 
(“Historically”).  
• O p: p is true at some past (or the current) state on the path 
(“Once”).  
• Sp q: q is true at some past state, and for every state that has then 
followed on the path, p has been true (“Since”). 
CTL is based on branching time, adding path quantifiers A (“for all 
execution paths”) and E (“for some execution path”). 
Property Specification Language (PSL) [28] is an extension of LTL 
and CTL designed to be compatible with hardware description lan-
guages. In addition to aiming at human readability [20], PSL offers an 
“LTL style” called Sequential Regular Expressions (SERE), which is 
convenient for describing multi-cycle behaviour. As an example [20], 
the property “if req is true, then, on the next cycle, ack is true for one 
cycle, then busy is true for three cycles, and then done is true for one 
cycle” is written as: 
always {req} |=>{ack ;busy[*3] ;done}!; 
In the example, “always” stands for G, and the repetition operator 
[*n] replaces nested X expressions. The SERE style of PSL can be useful 
in specifying I&C system properties related to timing and control se-
quencing [29]. 
2.3. Specifying properties for spurious failures 
To detect a spurious actuation scenario, the analyst does not ne-
cessarily have to specify any property for that specific purpose. Any 
specified property can reveal a counterexample where a spurious ac-
tuation occurs. For example, if the property addresses a requirement for 
opening a valve on high pressure, the counterexample can show the 
system model sending a close command on high pressure, instead. 
Nevertheless, it is important for the analyst to consider unwanted 
system behaviour separately. Requirement specification documents do 
not typically include self-evident statements such as “the system shall 
not end up in a deadlock / send contradictory commands / actuate 
spuriously”. Such requirements might be omitted due to, e.g., the dif-
ficulty in their verification. For any property that captures a desired 
(“good”) behaviour, there may be several complementary properties 
that capture unintended (“bad”) behaviour. Thankfully, spurious ac-
tuation properties share a type of symmetry with the intended-beha-
viour properties. 
Below, we consider four types of desired behaviours for I&C sys-
tems, and the associated properties for addressing spurious actuation 
(see Fig. 1). First, immediate response means that the system shall give 
the actuation order (response) if and only if the actuation criteria (re-
quest) is true. Second, delayed response means that the response shall 
occur a time after the request. In the bounded variant, the response 
follows the request after a set amount of time steps. In the unbounded 
variant, the response occurs after an unspecified time. Finally, triggered 
response means that the response shall occur immediately upon re-
quest, but may last longer. 
For immediate response, the intended property “a request shall lead 
to a response” can be written in LTL as the property: 
G(request response). (1)  
The counterexample would then contain a state where the request 
holds but the response is not true. However, (1) holds in a scenario 
where the response is true but the request is not. In order to address 
spurious actuation, let us turn (1) around to state: “a response implies 
that there is a request”, or: 
G(response request). (2)  
For delayed response–bounded, the intended property is expressed 
using nested X operators, e.g., for a delay of three time steps: 
G X X X(request ( ( response))). (3)  
The complementary spurious property, using nested Y operators, 
reads: 
G Y Y Y(response ( ( request))). (4)  
For delayed response—unbounded, we formulate the more general 
liveness property “a request shall eventually lead to a response”, or: 
G F(request response). (5)  
In order to address spurious actuation, the counterpart safety 
property is: 
G O(response request). (6)  
The symmetry of the above formulas exemplifies why, as stated 
in [27], Y and O are the “temporal duals” of X and F, respectively. If 
past temporal operators cannot be used, (6) can be rewritten using the 
less intuitive but equivalent expressions: ¬ ¬( request
¬U (response request)) [30], or: ¬ ¬G( response) ( response
U request) [31]. 
For triggered response, (1) and (2) do not apply, and an intended 
property “response shall be true when request changes from false to 




response). (7)  
Fig. 1. Types of intended response to an actuation request.  
A. Pakonen, et al.   Reliability Engineering and System Safety 205 (2021) 107237
3






( request request)). (8)  
If request being true at the initial state should count as a triggering 
event, (7) can be modified to: 
¬G Z(( request request)
response). (9) 






( request request)). (10)  
The desired behaviour can also be a combination of delayed re-
sponse and triggered response, in which case (4), (8) or (10) will not 
apply as such, but (6) can still be used. (6) is also true if (2) is true. 
While (6) can be thought of as a “universal” spurious property (see 
also the properties listed in Appendix A), it should be noted that a single 
past occurrence of request satisfies (6) even if there are several future 
occurrences of response. If the latter occurrence of response in Fig. 2 is 
considered a spurious actuation, the property will nevertheless hold. 
In order to detect the spurious actuation scenario in Fig. 2, we can 
specify that a response shall be preceded by a request, and there has not 





(response ( (( response)
response) request)). (11)  
2.4. Open-loop vs. closed-loop modelling 
I&C systems can be verified using open-loop or closed-loop models. 
Open-loop models only include the I&C logic, and do not account for 
feedback from the controlled process. In closed-loop modelling, feed-
back from the plant helps in filtering out irrelevant model behaviours, 
and can therefore reduce the state space [32]. 
Analysing architecture-level requirements (including non-functional 
requirements such as failure tolerance) is only possible if the plant is 
modelled as a whole. Model-based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is an 
approach that can be described as “the formalized application of 
modelling principles, methods, languages, and tools to the entire life-
cycle of large, complex, interdisciplinary, sociotechnical systems” [33]. 
The key artefact in MBSE is a unified, coherent system model. 
However, generating an accurate plant model for closing the loop 
can be challenging. Limiting the model behaviour can accidentally 
eliminate model executions relevant for safety, and the analysis times 
can actually increase [34]. We therefore continue to work with open- 
loop models of the I&C application logic, but, in Section 4, introduce 
hardware failures in order to verify single failure tolerance. 
3. Verification of nuclear i&c systems 
3.1. Nuclear power plant i&c systems and failure tolerance 
For obvious reasons, the I&C systems of a nuclear power plant need 
to be failure tolerant. Single failure criterion means that the system 
shall be able to perform its function even if any single component de-
signed for the function fails. Protection against single failure is achieved 
using several (perhaps identical) redundant subsystems placed in phy-
sically separated divisions. 
Consequential failure refers to “a failure caused by a failure of an-
other system, component or structure or by an internal or external 
event at the facility” [35]. For example, a failure of a power supply or 
ventilation system can result in the subsequent total failure of several 
I&C devices, but is still considered a single failure that shall be toler-
ated. 
Common cause failure (CCF) refers to a “failure of two or more 
structures, systems and components due to the same single event or 
cause” [35]. Protection against CCF can be achieved using diverse 
backup systems (e.g., a different supplier, technology, or operating 
principle). 
Single failure criterion is in the Finnish nuclear safety requirements 
referred to as N+1. An even stricter criterion called N+2 is used for the 
most critical systems (e.g., the reactor trip system). N+2 means that in 
addition to the single failure, the system still needs to perform its 
function even if “any other component or part of a redundant sys-
tem—or a component of an auxiliary system necessary for its oper-
ation—is simultaneously out of operation due to repair or main-
tenance” [35]. N+2 can be fulfilled with a three-redundant structure 
where one operating division is sufficient for performing the function 
(3  ×  100%), or a four-redundant structure where two operating di-
visions are needed (4  ×  50%). In Finland, digital I&C systems of the 
highest safety class2 are in practice always four-redundant. 
As an example of a four-redundant I&C system, let us consider the 
Protection System (PS) of the proposed U.S. version of the European 
Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR) nuclear plant [36]. PS is based on 
Areva NP’s TELEPERM XS technology, and each of the four independent 
divisions is located in a separate building [37] (see Fig. 3). 
The PS utilizes different types of functional units [36]. The Acqui-
sition and Processing Units (APUs) acquire signals from the process 
sensors and monitoring systems via the Signal Conditioning and Dis-
tribution System (SCDS) using a hardwired connection, perform cal-
culations and setpoint comparisons, and distribute the results to the 
Actuation Logic Units (ALUs) for voting. The ALUs perform voting over 
processing results and issue actuating results, taking into account op-
erator commands from the Safety Information and Control System 
(SICS). The actuation orders are then sent from the ALUs to the Priority 
and Actuator Control System (PACS) via a hardwired connection. 
The Monitoring and Services Interfaces (MSI) units provide status 
monitoring, and information for display to operators via the Process 
Information and Control System (PICS). The Service Unit (SU) is used 
for system diagnosis and periodic testing. 
Single failures that occur before the voting logic are handled by the 
voting logic in the ALU. Single failures at the voting logic level are 
handled by either redundancy within each division or redundancy 
across the four divisions. In the application logic (processed by the 
APUs and the ALUs), each signal has a status, which is set to “fault” 
upon failures detected by input modules of function processors. The 
status is then used to exclude invalid signals in selection (e.g., second- 
maximum, second-minimum3) and voting (n-out-of-m) blocks [36]. 
The notion of status or validity is not specific to Areva NP’s TELE-
PERM XS technology, but is also used in a similar manner in Rolls- 
Royce’s digital I&C platform Spinline [38]. 
Fig. 2. Even if the latter occurrence of response is considered a spurious ac-
tuation, the property G O(response request) will not reveal the issue. 
2 Finnish Safety Class 2 for I&C systems and equipment. 
3 These blocks select the second-largest and second-smallest of their input 
values, so that a single measured value alone crossing a limit would not lead to 
(potentially spurious) actuation. 
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3.2. Work process for model checking 
Based on previous research [39] and practical experience [40], VTT 
has developed a work process for the verification of vendor-specific, 
non-standard I&C logics4 (see Fig. 4). 
The first tasks are model boundary definition and requirement eli-
citation. Functional requirements can be found in system requirement 
specifications, or other documents containing suitable descriptions 
(e.g., a user manual). 
The modelling work begins with the construction of a library of 
basic function blocks, using the input language of NuSMV [40]. Manual 
specification of the block library is necessary, since nuclear I&C system 
suppliers use vendor-specific solutions (such as signal validity). The 
proprietary source code for the blocks might not be available, so spe-
cification is based on functional descriptions (e.g., a function block user 
manual). Confidence can be gained by verifying the blocks’ im-
plementation against formal properties, checking the equivalence of 
differing implementations created by two analysts independently, or 
synthesis-aided methods [42]. 
The analyst then models the selected I&C functions using the library 
of basic function block code elements, and specifies formal properties in 
LTL, CTL and/or PSL [29] based on the collected requirements. 
A NuSMV counterexample can reveal an error in the model or an 
incorrectly specified property (causing a “spurious counter-
example” [43]), in which case the analyst fixes the error, and runs 
NuSMV again [39]. If NuSMV produces a counterexample that—after 
close inspection of the source documents—can only be explained by a 
problem in the design, the issue is documented and reported to relevant 
stakeholders. 
The only fully automated part of the process is verification with 
NuSMV. In the next section, we discuss tool support for I&C function 
modelling and counterexample interpretation. 
3.3. MODCHK—A practical i&c model checking tool 
VTT has developed a graphical tool [44] called MODCHK (Fig. 5) for 
verifying I&C application logics based on function block diagrams with 
NuSMV. 
MODCHK is used to:  
1. Specify a library of vendor-specific basic function blocks with a text 
editor.  
2. Model the block diagrams with a graphical editor. Composite blocks 
can also be specified, allowing for multilevel hierarchy [44]. The 
composite elements are especially useful for modelling distributed 
nuclear applications with redundant, identical divisions (see Fig. 5).  
3. Specify the properties with a text editor.  
4. Generate the necessary input files and run NuSMV. 
5. Visualize the counterexamples produced by NuSMV with an ani-
mated view [43] of the block diagram (see Fig. 5). Signals with an 
invalid status are shown with a dashed line. 
Each signal between the blocks carries both a Boolean or integer 
value V, and the associated validity status (as a Boolean variable 
V_FAULT). Inside the basic blocks, each input is also assigned a variable 
V_CONNECTED, allowing the analyst to specify how unconnected in-
puts affect the processing logic. 
The status processing logic is explicitly defined for each basic block. 
As an example, in TELEPERM XS systems, “passive status processing” 
means that the status of the output signal is formed by simply OR-gating 
the status of each related input [40]. In “active status processing”, the 
output value is only calculated from valid input signals [45]. 
To demonstrate “active” status processing, we show below the code 
for an exemplar function block. The 1-out-of-2 voting block will output 
TRUE if at least one of the two input signals is TRUE and valid, or if 
both inputs are invalid. 
Fig. 3. Simplified architecture of the U.S. EPR Protection System (modified from [33]).  
4 While function block diagrams are a “programming language” [41], we 
discuss the verification of “logic” rather than “software”. First, the actual source 
code (automatically generated based on the diagrams) is typically unavailable 
in nuclear industry projects. Second, we also work with FPGA logics, which 
cannot be called software. 
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3.4. Practical results from the nuclear industry 
Since 2008, VTT has applied model checking in practical customer 
projects in the Finnish nuclear industry [16]. The clients include (but 
are not limited to) the nuclear regulatory body and two plant operators. 
Olkiluoto 3 is an EPR under construction. On commission from the 
Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), VTT has 
evaluated the application logic of the Protection System and the 
Priority and Actuation Control System. Both systems are based on the 
TELEPERM XS platform, PS being a software-based system, and PACS 
based on Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) technology. 
The Loviisa NPP includes two reactors of the type VVER-4400. Old 
analogue I&C systems have been replaced with modern digital tech-
nology (based on Rolls-Royce’s Spinline platform) in a renewal project. 
On commission from the plant operator Fortum, VTT has performed 
independent, third-party verification of the application logic of seven 
different I&C systems. Based on the results, design modifications have 
been made to the Reactor Trip System and the Reactor Power Control 
System [16]. 
Hanhikivi 1 is an NPP planned to be built in Pyhäjoki. The utility 
Fennovoima has submitted a construction license application for an 
AES-2006 type reactor. On commission from Fennovoima, VTT has 
evaluated the Hanhikivi 1 functional architecture, which uses function 
block diagrams to describe the safety functions of the plant in an early 
design stage. VTT has detected design issues that could lead to spurious 
actuation, contradictory commands, or otherwise incorrect response. 
In all the above projects combined, between 2008 and 2019, VTT 
has identified 57 design issues in I&C application logic. The reader 
should note that the issues are about a single system not behaving ac-
cording to its stated requirements in some particular scenario, however 
Fig. 4. Work process for the verification of vendor-specific I&C application logics.  
Fig. 5. MODCHK is a graphical tool for verifying composite function block diagrams with NuSMV.  
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unlikely. We wish to emphasise that we do not discuss the safety re-
levance of any issue, which may be purely theoretical5 Some of the 
systems or functions have been considered in isolation–not accounting 
for, e.g., the characteristics of the controlled process, or safeguards built 
into other related systems–and any issue might therefore be practically 
irrelevant in its actual context. VTT only modelled the application logic, 
and no hardware failures were assumed. All the issues can therefore be 
attributed to human error in the application logics’ design processes. 
Of the 57 design issues, 21 (37%) deal with spurious actuation. We 
can further divide these scenarios in two types:  
1. Spontaneous spurious failure occurs when the criteria for actuation 
has not been valid before the actuation command.  
2. Stuck-on spurious failure occurs when the actuation command has 
first been given based on valid criteria, but the command remains 
set while the criteria no longer justify or allow it. 
Sixteen of the detected issues are of the spontaneous type, and five 
of the stuck-on type. The characteristics of the issues are described in  
Appendix A. For each issue, we present a short generalized description, 
and then list the property that revealed the issue, elements in the design 
that introduce complexity, the number of function blocks and NuSMV 
variables, the number of reachable states in the model, and time it took 
NuSMV to verify the failing property. 
The analysis times are based on experiments with an Intel Core i7- 
6600U CPU with a clock rate of 2.6 GHz. NuSMV 2.6.0 was run on a 
single core with the options “-int -dynamic”. 
Some of the issues were found with a composite model containing 
several different safety functions of the same system(s), which explains 
the model characteristics that are shared between issues 1–3, 6–7, and 
11–12. In total, the issues in Appendix A were found in six different I&C 
systems. 
Notably, the “universal” spurious property (formula (6) in  
Section 2.3) occurs in five of the examples, in two cases preceded by 
G(p) → , which is usable for filtering out irrelevant executions, looking 
for more counterexamples, or seeking to better understand model be-
haviour [29]. 
The PSL property never{p[*n]} is obviously convenient for ver-
ifying that signal p does not get stuck on (for n cycles, at least). In LTL, 
the equivalent property is expressed with nested X operators. 
3.5. A practical example of spurious actuation 
We now present an example of a real design issue resulting in 
spurious actuation, revealed using model checking in a practical in-
dustry project (issue 8 in Appendix A). The originally verified appli-
cation logic consisted of 73 function blocks. Here, we only include the 
five blocks that are needed for reproducing the problematic scenario. 
The appearance and the detailed processing logic of the function blocks 
have been modified to obscure their origin. The simplified, masked 
application logic can be found in Fig. 4. The PID Controller element is 
represented in the NuSMV model by a simple abstraction. 
The intended (here, simplified) functionality is PID control of a 
safety actuator. When the control mode is switched on, the current 
measurement value (based on second-minimum voting over four re-
dundant signals) is memorized, and then used as the setpoint for the 
controller. When the control mode is switched off, the controller is 
disabled. 
The analyst discovered the issue by verifying a property not speci-
fically addressing spurious actuation, but the selection of the controller 
setpoint. The property read, simplified: G
Fig. 6. A counterexample scenario for spurious actuation (actual industry example).  
5 Discussion on the potential plant level effects for some of the issues can be 
found in [46]. 




G((measurement 0) measurement_FAULT) ((setpoint
0) enable)),
with 
“measurement” meaning the output of the “2nd Max” block. In other 
words, “assuming that the valid (actual) measurement is never zero, 
then zero shall never be selected as the setpoint”. The issue would also 
have been revealed by the spurious property (type (6) in Section 2.3): 
=
= ¬
G O(((setpoint n) enable) ((meas
n) measurement_FAULT)),
i.e., for any allowed 
integer value n, “n can only be selected as the setpoint if a valid mea-
surement has at some point had the value n.” The counterexample 
output by NuSMV is visualised in Fig. 6. 
The counterexample begins at the initial state, where the mea-
surements have invalid status (dashed line in Fig. 6). The “2nd Max” 
block will in such a case output a user-configurable initial value, for 
which the pre-set default value is zero. The value is output as such 
(including validity) by the “Analog memory” block. 
In the next state, the control mode is switched on at the exact same 
processing cycle where the measurements turn valid. The “Analog 
memory” block is switched to hold mode, and then keeps outputting the 
previous input value for as long as the hold mode is on. 
As the now valid measurement is almost certainly more than zero, 
the simplified PID Controller element then issues the “close” command 
spuriously. The analyst is aware that the PID element is not accurately 
modelled, but also realises that a realistic PID component would—given 
the incorrect set-point zero—also issue the “close” command. 
The scenario would be difficult to detect using testing or simulation, 
because:  
1. situations where the system is rebooted to its initial state are very 
rare, and here the reboot also coincides with invalid measurement 
data,  
2. two unrelated events (measurements turn valid, and control mode is 
switched on) need to occur at the exact same processing cycle, and/ 
or  
3. the analyst should know to focus on intricate details on how two of 
the 73 blocks process validity. 
With MODCHK, locating the cause of the spurious actuation is ty-
pically straightforward. The animated view highlights when the signal 
targeted in the property is actuated, and the analyst can easily find the 
states in the counterexample where that is the case. As the counter-
example can also contain states where the signal is actuated on demand 
(e.g., the spurious actuation is of the “stuck-on” variety), the analyst 
then needs to check the states to find the one(s) where the signal is 
active without demand. Visualisation of the signal values helps the 
analyst in navigating the diagram to see if the proper criteria are ful-
filled. For LTL properties, we have also developed a counterexample 
explanation tool that can locate the state where the failure occurs [43], 
which is particularly useful if the counterexample is long. 
4. Single failure tolerance in model checking 
4.1. Modelling approach for single failures 
So far, we have only considered application logic issues, with the 
assumption that the underlying hardware does not fail. Below, we 
broaden our scope by including hardware failures. 
Previous work on similar I&C application logic models [47] has 
shown that modelling hardware failure modes to each processor and 
communication link results in excessive verification times. We therefore 
have to simplify the failure model, which is possible if we focus on 
single failure in open-loop models. To illustrate the concept, we use the 
U.S. EPR PS (see Fig. 7), but the same approach is applicable to any 
system with redundancies and a voting unit. 
For the N+2 criterion (see Section 3.1), we assume that the division 
that is out of operation due to repair or maintenance will not drive the 
actuators. We assume that an inhibition function is built into the 
hardware and/or application logic. (For example, when a sensor is 
placed in a maintenance bypass, a lockout attaches a faulty status to the 
sensor’s signal [37].) The out-of-operation division will thus only issue 
actuation orders if it fails. Below, we therefore focus on single failure 
tolerance, in general. 
As shown in Fig. 7, we use several simplifications. A single failure 
can disable an entire division (e.g., consequential failure due to power 
supply). That also means that the other three divisions cannot have any 
failures (at the same time), otherwise the single failure criterion no 
longer holds. Therefore, it follows that:  
1. It is sufficient to model the failures for one division only. 
2. We can pick any non-failing division, and if the divisions are iden-
tical, any verification result for that division (in Fig. 7, div. 1) will 
hold for at least two other divisions. Therefore, there is no need to 
model the outputs of the other divisions, which is why it is sufficient 
to model the voting logics (ALUs) for just one division. The pro-
cessing logic before the selected ALU is needed, which is why we 
include all the redundant APUs, but not the other ALUs. Such a 
simplification is routinely used in VTT’s work to reduce the models’ 
complexity. 
The included ALU cannot fail, because we have assumed that the 
fully modelled division is not the failing one. In open-loop analysis, we 
are not interested in the output of the potentially failing ALU, which is 
why it can be excluded from the model altogether. 
Another significant simplification we use is the injection of failure 
points to a limited number of locations. At those locations, we assume 
that the HW failure can have occurred in any part of the system that has 
processed the signal by that point, and the signal is faulty from that 
location on. Since we are primarily interested in how the application 
logic running in the APU and ALU function processors interacts with 
hardware failures, we inject the failures in two locations: (1), for each 
signal entering the APUs of the failing division, and (2), for each signal 
leaving the APUs of the failing division (see Fig. 7), i.e., between the 
APU and ALU. 
The final simplification has to do with how the failures are modelled 
on the signal level. The model is not based on detailed analyses of 
realistic hardware component failure modes. Instead, at the specified 
failure points, the correct value of each signal is simply replaced with a 
nondeterministic variable. The validity (status) of each signal is also 
nondeterministic, i.e., the failure can be self-announcing or non-self- 
announcing. Due to the nondeterminism, each signal may fail in-
dependently, or all signals may fail simultaneously (some passively, 
some actively). 
The two failure injection points cover all conceivable failure modes 
of the hardware components [36,37] listed in Table 1. We assume a 
network topology where any failure in a failed division cannot affect 
the APU—ALU communication between the remaining redundant di-
visions. 
The failure model is implemented in MODCHK (and the corre-
sponding NuSMV model) by inserting a module in the selected division 
to signal connection to/from the affected APUs. Module FAULT_BIN is 
used for Boolean and FAULT_ANA for integer signals. Both blocks have 
the output FAILURE that allows the analyst to also observe the non-self- 
announcing failures. The NuSMV source code for FAULT_BIN is shown 
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below. 
For FAULT_ANA, the integer values the signal can have upon failure 
are given as a user-configurable parameter. To limit the state space 
growth, the analyst might have to select only a few possible values. For 
the input signals to APUs, the analyst can use the similarly discretized 
values as the model inputs. For APU—ALU communication, the choice 
might not be as straightforward, but the PS function diagrams in [37] 
show only binary signals exchanged between APUs and ALUs. 
4.2. Experimental evaluation 
We evaluated the modelling approach using actual industrial ex-
amples. We collected suitable models that VTT had constructed for both 
TXS and Spinline based four-redundant safety systems in practical 
projects. Failures were then manually modelled for a single division. 
For each model, between four and seven original properties were se-
lected, including true and false properties, and both CTL and LTL/PSL. 
If needed, the properties were modified to account for the injected 
failures. NuSMV was then used to calculate the effect of the failure 
injection on the model state space and the analysis times. 
The selected models did not represent the most complex functions 
that VTT has verified, because such functions often have to be verified 
by including only a single division, or one logic unit, or even just parts 
of a logic unit. Here, we included models where all four divisions were 
originally modelled without severe performance issues. 
The results are listed in Table 2. The analysis time is the average for 
one to five different properties per language. NuSMV was executed as 
explained in Section 3.4. All the CTL properties were true, while a third 
of the LTL/PSL properties were false for both models. The numbers of 
function blocks and NuSMV variables are for the original model, and do 
not include the failure modelling elements. 
From the results, it is apparent that computational overhead from 
single failure modelling is practically negligible. The analysis times 
might even decrease (see example 1). Despite a significant increase in 
the state space (particularly examples 8 and 11), the maximum absolute 
increase in analysis time was 16,3 s (example 2). Relatively, the highest 
Fig. 7. Simplification of the NuSMV model based on symmetry.  
Table 1 
I&C hardware components that have their failures covered in the model.    
Failure point Hardware components and systems  
Before the APU • Process sensors 
• SCDS 
– signal condition modules 
– signal distribution modules 
• Service Unit (SU) 
• Hardwired connections 
– sensor to SCDS 
– SCDS to APU 
– SU to MSI 
• Communication network 
– MSI to APU 
• APU  
– input module 
After the APU • APU 
– function processor 
– communication module  
– optical link module 
Both points simultaneously 
(consequential failures) 
• Power Supply (Class 1E 
uninterruptible power supply, EUPS)  
• Heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning (HVAC) system 
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increase can be seen in examples where the analysis time was still parts 
of a second. In example 2, the relative change is a 20% increase for CTL 
and a 46% increase for LTL/PSL. We further found that the increase of 
the state space is largely connected with the addition of non-
determinism within failure blocks—for example, adding a failure block 
that can nondeterministically substitute the signal (as well as its va-
lidity status) by two different values expands the state space in at least 
four times. We removed this effect by dividing the number of states by 
the magnitude of this expansion, and the result is shown in the “nor-
malized reachable states” column of the table. Notably, in three cases 
the result is the same as with no failures, meaning that the addition of 
failures only influences the output values of models, not their memory- 
stored state. 
Finally, we visualized the connection between the number of 
reachable states (normalized in case of one failure) and model checking 
time in Fig. 8 where each data point corresponds to a pair of a model 
and a number of failures. In order to make the distributions of state 
space sizes and times close to normal, we took the logarithms of all the 
values. The logarithm of model checking time of each checked property 
was taken independently, and then the mean was calculated (thus, the 
obtained values do not strictly correspond to any of the columns in  
Table 2). Fig. 8 also shows linear regression trend lines for the cases of 
no failures and one failure separately. 
5. Related research 
5.1. I&c software risk assessment 
A lot has been written about the risk that spurious actuations pose to 
plant safety, and the difficulty in analysing such failures. Proposed 
solutions are harder to find. Nuclear regulatory bodies are working 
towards consensus on regulatory guidance on evaluating spurious ac-
tuations [48]. 
Approaches for analysing the effects of spurious failures using 
probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) are explored in [1]. PSA is a well- 
established methodology for risk based-decision making. In nuclear 
applications, it is used during design and operation for, e.g., identifying 
weaknesses, and prioritizing components and systems for safety clas-
sification, testing, inspection, and maintenance [49]. Spurious actua-
tion failure modes can be “quite well covered” [1] in modern PSA 
models, but there is no consensus on how to treat software relia-
bility [1,50]. There is also limited operational data available that would 
support plausible reliability estimates for I&C application logics [46], 
since failures of safety system application software are rarely observed 
during operation [50]. 
Our work, in turn, shows how design issues causing spurious ac-
tuation can be detected (and therefore eliminated) through determi-
nistic analyses. In addition to reducing the risk in practice, the results 
(that indicate existence or non-existence of design faults) have an im-
pact on the estimated probability of a software failure [46]. Further-
more, the scenarios that model checking reveals (see Appendix A) could 
lead to new failure modes and/or fault propagation paths added to the 
PSA model [46], improving coverage. 
In any case, a realistic assessment of overall safety calls for a ba-
lanced combination of both probabilistic and deterministic analysis 
methods [51]. 
5.2. I&c application logic verification 
A great deal of the research on I&C system model checking has fo-
cused on the automatic generation of models based on standard PLC 
languages, either IEC 61131-3 (e.g.,  [52–54]), or IEC 61499 [55]—or, 
in the case of FPGAs, directly based on hardware description lan-
guages [56]. As we point out in Section 3.2, such approaches are not 
directly applicable in the nuclear industry, where vendors use pro-
prietary function blocks with industry-specific, non-standard features 
like status processing. 
Due to the difficulty in mastering temporal logic languages, another 
key research topic is user-friendly property specification. Dwyer et al. 
have published an influential collection of property specification pat-
terns [31]. I&C domain specific patterns have been suggested in, e.g.,  
Table 2 
Comparison of NuSMV performance for no-failure against single failure models.               
No HW failures One HW failure  
Function NuSMV Reachable CTL LTL / Reachable Normalized CTL LTL /  
blocks variables states (s) PSL states reachable (s) PSL      
(s)  states  (s)  
1 51 230 1, 75 · 1020 32,8 75,1 3, 14 · 1023 2, 04 · 1020 4,90 57,5 
2 179 893 3, 96 · 1025 11,8 63,7 6, 64 · 1032 1, 62 · 1029 17,2 80,0 
3 78 354 1, 29 · 1015 1,40 2,70 2, 52 · 1018 1, 64 · 1015 3,70 3,80 
4 72 318 5, 20 · 1020 1,20 0,92 1, 38 · 1029 2, 06 · 1021 2,30 1,50 
5 76 388 8, 85 · 1045 0,92 1,40 3, 12 · 1059 8, 85 · 1045 1,20 1,90 
6 118 785 2, 18 · 1024 0,45 1,70 3, 57 · 1028 8, 73 · 1024 0,92 2,50 
7 140 994 7, 95 · 1028 0,30 0,66 6, 65 · 1035 3, 17 · 1029 0,46 0,85 
8 100 694 6, 56 · 108 0,23 0,47 9, 28 · 1019 3, 00 · 1015 0,34 0,63 
9 85 484 4, 74 · 1021 0,19 0,28 9, 68 · 1024 1, 89 · 1022 0,30 0,44 
10 211 1229 1, 57 · 1013 0,11 0,50 7, 21 · 1016 1, 57 · 1013 0,14 0,27 
11 143 800 4, 50 · 1015 0,10 0,17 3, 96 · 1028 4, 50 · 1015 0,95 0,46 
12 73 385 7, 30 · 1017 0,08 0,07 9, 18 · 1024 5, 84 · 1018 0,24 0,22 
13 26 100 5, 80 · 109 0,03 0,26 6, 83 · 1013 6, 67 · 1010 0,08 0,39    
Fig. 8. Scatter plot showing the dependency between the number of states in 
the model and model checking time. 
A. Pakonen, et al.   Reliability Engineering and System Safety 205 (2021) 107237
10
[57], and different graphical languages are listed in [29] and [58]. 
In [59], formal requirements for automotive applications have been 
collected in order to develop a specification language for I&C en-
gineering. 
In the nuclear domain, model checking has been applied for I&C 
software verification in Korea [60], Hungary [61], and at the European 
Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) [54]. In [60], successive 
revisions of IEC 61131-3 function block diagrams were checked for 
equivalence. In [54], IEC 61131-3 programs were transformed into a 
network of synchronised automata. After property-preserving reduc-
tions, the intermediate model was then verified with nuXmv [62]. 
In [61], the verified system is also based on TELEPERM XS technology, 
and the model includes signal status processing. The block diagram was 
first reinterpreted as an “almost identical” Petri net, and CTL properties 
were then verified with model checking. The authors however had to 
constrain possible input values to the “most significant failure scenario” 
in order to bring the number of states down to 46811. The use of 
symbolic model checkers is mentioned as a future option. 
Our approach has built-in support for custom (non-standard) func-
tion blocks, omits intermediate model transformation steps, and re-
quires no simplification of the model beyond the abstractions imposed 
by heuristics. The downside is that the library of basic blocks has to be 
specified manually. 
5.3. Analysing hardware failure tolerance 
Several studies address failure tolerance in the context of model 
checking (see Table 3 for examples). In [9] and [10], failures are added 
into a model of a two-redundant aerospace system, in order to verify 
tolerance against single failure. In [12], an error model is added to a 
nominal model of a satellite control system platform. In [13], the target 
is a railway system. In [11], real-time model checking is used to verify a 
three-redundant aerospace system. In [8], a system model duplicate is 
given incorrect measurement data, and its performance is then com-
pared with the original model. 
Failure modelling is related to failure mode and effects analysis 
(FMEA) [63]—a bottom-up method for reviewing potential component- 
level failure modes and their system-level effects–and fault tree analysis 
(FTA) [64]—a top-down method where an undesired system state is 
broken down to component-level events. In [14], FTA and FMEA are 
used to assist in the modelling of transitions from normal to failed 
states, and NuSMV is then used to verify system model conformity. 
In [65], a NuSMV add-on called NuSMV-SA—capable of dynamic FTA 
and FMEA–is used to analyse the behaviour of the system model in 
degraded conditions. In [66] and [67], model checking is used to par-
tially automate FMEA by searching for system-level consequences of 
low-level failures, with [67] focusing on software issues. In [68], 
probabilistic model checking is used to identify the components that 
contribute the most to system-level failures. 
A limitation in many of the proposed methods is that the system 
model has to be kept very abstract, or the model becomes too complex 
to be verifiable in reasonable time [10,47]. Instead of detailed design, 
the target of verification is the “functional behaviour” [66], “early” 
functional [14] or architecture level [12] model, “specified beha-
viour” [10], or other simplification. Model state spaces, when revealed, 
can be relatively modest, processing times still rather long (see  
Table 3), and there may exist “serious questions about the scal-
ability” [9]. (It should of course be noted that the performance data is 
not directly comparable to ours[10]. and [13], for example, were 
published two decades ago, using tools and processing power available 
at the time.) 
Closest to our work is [47], where nuclear I&C application logic 
models similar to ours are supplemented with detailed hardware failure 
modes, as well as accident and transient scenarios. A model containing 
seven different safety systems is then verified using NuSMV. However, 
the application logics have to be kept very simple, and even then, only 
BMC based verification of invariant properties is practically fea-
sible [47]. 
Using our approach, we were able to include the hardware failure 
modes without having to simplify the application logic model. 
6. Discussion 
The obvious conclusion from VTT’s customer work is that model 
checking truly is an effective method for detecting I&C application logic 
design issues that could result in spurious actuation of critical systems. 
In addition, the data collected from the industry projects reveals in-
teresting statistics about what it is in the design of the logics that can 
cause them to fail. 
From Section 3.4, we see that each of the failed designs contained 
either a memory or a delay element, or both. A memory element can be 
either a flip-flop switch or latch, or any element that stores a value (e.g., 
a block whose output is based on last valid input value). Feedback loops 
were found in four designs. (A feedback loop also introduces a memory/ 
delay element out of necessity, since the processing order of the blocks 
needs to be explicit.) 
One strength of function block diagrams as a programming language 
is that it is relatively easy to understand the “flow” of processing from 
inputs to outputs. However, memory and delay elements, feedback 
loops, and blocks processing signal validity in an active way, all in-
terfere with the flow, making it harder to design and manually review 
the logic. Delay and memory elements are also very common in I&C 
application logics, due to, e.g., the dynamic characteristics of the pro-
cesses being controlled [29]. 
Let us also consider the oft-occurring characteristics of the coun-
terexample scenarios that revealed the design issues. First, in six cases, 
the issue involved very exact timing of external events (independent 
issues occurring on the same processor cycle). Second, four of the issues 
Table 3 
Related work on model checking and fault tolerance.        
Ref. Concept State Analysis Model Case system(s)   
space size time checker(s)   
[8] Deviation analysis – – NuSMV Aircraft altitude switch 
[47] Functional verification incl. failures and plant transients – 30–110 s NuSMV Nuclear safety systems 
[9] Functional verification incl. failures – – SCADE, Simulink verifier Aircraft wheel brake system 
[10] Functional verification incl. failures 196 608 30 s Spin Spacecraft controller 
[13] Functional verification incl. failures ≤  122 767 – AMC/JACK Railway interlocking system 
[11] Functional verification incl. failures – – UPPAAL Aerospace system 
[12] Functional verification incl. failures ≤  1,0  ·  1013 ≤  12 min NuSMV Platform for satellite control systems 
[14] Functional verification incl. FTA+FMEA – – NuSMV Automotive break-by-wire system 
[65] Functional verification incl. FTA+FMEA ≤  3,8  ·  1025 ≤  13 min NuSMV Aircraft power supply, braking system 
[66] Model checking for automated FMEA ≤  35  ·  109 ≤  4 days SAL Metal press, mine pump, drug infusion pump 
[67] Model checking for automated FMEA – 4–10 min Spin Interface definition 
[68] Probabilistic model checking in FMEA ≤  615 600 ≤  12h PRISM Airbag system 
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involved human actions, i.e., personnel (operation of maintenance) 
doing something ill-advised and/or ill-timed. Third, three issues re-
quired the interaction of several I&C systems for the problem to occur, 
and analysing the systems in isolation would not have revealed the 
issue. Validity processing logic was crucial in four issues. 
In Table 4, we also list the prevalence of the above-mentioned 
characteristics in all the 57 design issues identified in the industry 
projects (including both active and passive failure). Out of the designs 
that failed to actuate, three failed in a way that a signal froze perma-
nently to some value, requiring, e.g., system restart for recovery. 
It is hard to draw further conclusions from the fact that 37% of the 
detected issues were of the spurious kind. Most of the designs analysed 
in the projects had already undergone verification and validation (V&V) 
based on methods that are more conventional. Since spurious failures 
are by their nature harder to analyse than passive failures [1], it is 
likely that the spurious cases are over-represented in our data. The 
“true” statistical share of hidden design issues potentially leading to 
spurious failures is difficult to estimate. 
In Sections 3.4 and 4.2, the number of reachable states in the 
NuSMV model is shown to be as high as 8,85  ·  1045, or 3,12  ·  1059 
when hardware failure modelling is included. Let us consider how such 
a high number is possible, when the modelled system consists of mostly 
binary logic. For n binary signals, there are obviously 2n possible value 
combinations, or 22n, if we include the status of each signal as a free 
input. Internal memory elements also increase the state space. How-
ever, our models are not limited to binary logic. Since NuSMV can only 
handle integer numbers and discrete time, we have to discretise several 
model signals:  
1. Analogue inputs are modelled as a range or enumeration of integer 
variables. To limit the growth of the state space, the analyst can 
limit the enumeration to a set of values that are sufficient to allow 
for all relevant executions [40], e.g., by selecting one value below a 
limit threshold, and another from above it.  
2. If an analogue signal is memorized in the logic (e.g., a last-valid- 
signal logic, or a cycle step delay needed to implement a feedback 
loop), an integer variable needs to be added. If the analyst cannot 
narrow down the possible values to a small set, the computational 
cost increases significantly.  
3. Each delay element needs its own internal clock variable, another 
integer variable, for which a suitable range needs to be speci-
fied [40]. 
When we introduce the hardware failures, not only do we add 
several free inputs (for each FAULT_BIN and FAULT_ANA element), we 
also allow the model to reach states that it would not reach if the signals 
inside the logic were deterministic (which, of course, is exactly our 
objective in failure modelling). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the number of reachable 
states alone is not a sufficient (or necessarily even credible) measure of 
computational complexity in model checking. From Table 2 in  
Section 4.2, we can see that a model with 3, 12 · 1059 reachable states is 
analysed in less than two seconds, while a model with 1, 75 · 1020 
reachable states takes more than a minute to process. It is obviously 
important to consider the analysis time when assessing practical ap-
plicability. 
We made no effort to determine what the realistic failure modes for 
the underlying I&C hardware components could be. In our non-
deterministic failure model, any kind of failure–conceivable or not—is 
allowed. From the point of view of safety, such a view might be pre-
ferable. Still, the most unlikely failure we can think of is the “chaotic” 
behaviour of a function processor (or an output module) where some of 
its outputs fail actively while others passively. Such a scenario can be 
feasible if the components overheat, which is possible if, e.g., the 
ventilation system fails—a single failure [3,18]. Risk-based analysis 
methods can be used to decide whether the cost of redesigning the 
application logic to tolerate a highly improbable failure mode is justi-
fied [49]. 
In our experiments, we were able to show that the failure modelling 
approach is applicable to models of real-world systems created in 
practical industry projects. The computational overhead is practically 
negligible. However, our experiments did not allow for a complete re- 
verification of the target systems, and in any case, we did not identify 
any previously unknown design issues. Whether design issues involving 
both the I&C application logic design and the underlying hardware 
component failures are actually identified (and how common they are) 
remains to be seen in future customer projects. 
Regarding the validity of our experiments, the failure modules were 
inserted manually, using a graphical environment. Since our tools do 
not yet automate the process, verifying that the failures were correctly 
modelled was based on manual review. Second, any claims that we 
make about the complexity of verification problems focus on the 
practical applicability of using a specific tool. The heuristics of NuSMV 
may be biased, which prevents us from making objective assessments of 
the “actual” increase in complexity resulting from failure injection. 
Third, there are many ways to express temporal properties, and the 
selections used in our work may have a bias concerning the complexity 
of verification. However, we assume that model checking performance 
depends more on the model and the selected algorithm than the 
property. 
When using any formal method for verifying safety critical systems, 
it is important to recognise the limitations in the formal descriptions, 
methods and tools used [5]. In our approach:  
• What is verified is whether the way function blocks are connected in 
the diagram can result in unwanted behaviours. Modelling is based 
on functional descriptions, and no assumptions are made about the 
correctness of the function block source code, generated application 
logic source code, or compiled machine instructions [40] (or, in case 
of FPGA, the generated netlist or configuration).  
• The model is representative of the actual application logic only to a 
certain degree. NuSMV can only handle elementary mathematical 
operations with integers. Discretisation of real numbers and other 
necessary abstractions are performed manually. 
Table 4 
Oft-occurring characteristics in the failed designs and the scenarios that revealed the failures.        
Spurious actuation All design issues   
issues (count: 21) (count: 57)  
Elements in the design Memory block (e.g., flip-flop switch) 76% 68% 
Delay block 76% 60%  
Feedback loop 19% 28% 
Features in the counterexample scenario Exact timing of external events 33% 33% 
Human user actions 24% 28% 
Interaction of several I&C systems 14% 14% 
Validity processing logic 19% 11%  
Permanently frozen state – 5% 
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• It is difficult to guarantee that all relevant properties have been 
properly formalised. The requirement specification serving as input 
might not be complete [40]. In any case, effort is needed from the 
analyst to consider every aspect of a requirement (see Section 2.3).  
• It is possible to make a human error both in specifying the model 
and in formalising the property, so that the (false) property holds for 
the (false) model, hiding both errors, and producing incorrect re-
sults [40].  
• Correctness of the model checker cannot be exhaustively 
proved [40]. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have shown that model checking can be used to 
detect issues that could lead to spurious actuation of industrial I&C 
systems, regardless of whether the cause of the actuation is a systemic 
failure due to human error in application logic design, or a random 
failure of hardware component. The way that we construct the model 
accounts for plant transients, human actions (operators or maintenance 
personnel), environmental conditions, and failures of support systems 
(e.g., power supply, ventilation, testing equipment). We can inject the 
hardware failure modes in the model without resorting to further ab-
straction and simplification in the way the application logic is mod-
elled. Model checking enables exhaustive verification, but only for the 
properties that have been specified. The analysis results can only be 
conclusive if the human user has captured every relevant property. 
While direct errors in property specification are often revealed by 
spurious counterexamples [43], omissions are another matter. For any 
functional requirement addressing the intended response of the system, 
there may be several properties needed to rule out unwanted beha-
viour. To make matters worse, there is no silver bullet for the more 
general challenge of making formal property specification easy [43]. 
So far, we have focused on a single I&C system. When we consider 
the entire overall I&C architecture of a nuclear power plant, single 
failure tolerance becomes more complex to verify. If it takes several 
different I&C systems to carry out a safety function, the failure criterion 
must be applied to the entire chain of systems–from measurements to 
actuators, including all supporting systems—as a functional whole. In 
our future work, we therefore need to broaden the scope. After all, 14% 
of the design issues VTT has revealed result from the way several dif-
ferent I&C systems operate as a whole. 
In our tools, further development is needed for automatic import of 
the block diagrams, property editing, and counterexample explana-
tion [43]. We also aim to investigate whether tools such as nuXmv [62] 
or HyComp [25] could be used to avoid some of the modelling sim-
plifications imposed by NuSMV. 
The difficulty in analysing spurious actuation is tied to the challenge 
of achieving 100% test coverage. The obvious benefit of formal ver-
ification is exhaustive coverage, and the ability to address unwanted 
behaviour just as well as intended behaviour. The results of VTT’s 
customer projects prove that systemic errors leading to spurious ac-
tuation of I&C systems are in practice detected with model checking. To 
the best of our knowledge, it is the only truly effective method avail-
able. We hope our example inspires more widespread adoption of the 
method, because there is no reason for the established use of industrial 
I&C system model checking to be only limited to the Finnish nuclear 
industry. 
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Appendix A. List of detected design issues with spontaneous (1–16) and stuck-on (17–21) spurious failure          
Desc. Failed Elements Func. NuSMV Reachable Analysis   
property type in design blocks vars states time (s)  
1 Actuation criterion is signals a and b being active at the same time. However, a remains in an internal memory (which is supposed to reset automatically). Later, signal b alone 
can lead to actuation.   
p q r s s sG X X Y YY( ) ( ) memory, delay, feedback loop 130 530 4, 52·1038 0,4a
2 Actuation of a safety function on a certain channel is supposed to be inhibited if signal a is true. However, if a first becomes active on channel 2, and then immediately for the 
channel 1, actuation can (under certain conditions) occur on channel 1.   
p qG( ) memory 130 530 4, 52·1038 0,2a
3 Actuation criterion is signals a and b being active at the same time. However, a remains in an internal memory (which is supposed to reset automatically). Later, signal b alone 
can lead to actuation.   
p qG O( ) memory, delay, feedback loop 130 530 4, 52·1038 0,2a
4 If a channel is put to test mode, test inputs can set a memory element. When the channel returns to normal use, the stored signal leads to actuation.   
p q rG G O( ) ( ) memory, delay 118 779 2, 18·1024 23,7 
5 If a channel is put to test mode, test inputs can set a delay element. If the channel is immediately returned to normal use, the delayed signal leads to actuation.   
p q rG G O( ) ( ) memory, delay 118 773 5, 45·1023 14,0 
6 One of the criteria for an OPEN command is delayed in the logic, such that on demand, the CLOSE command is actuated instead.   
always {p[*n]}|->{q}! delay 60 254 5, 39·1018 35,7 
7 Actuation is supposed to occur if measurement a decreases below a limit value. However, actuation occurs at a certain range above the limit, instead.  
p q rG X X( ) memory, delay 60 254 5, 39·1018 8,6   
8b Invalid (e.g., off-scale) measurements on system initialisation lead to a default value 0 being stored into memory. If the measurements return to normal at the exact same 
moment the operator enables a controller, the controller uses the default 0 as the setpoint, and actuates a spurious “close” command.   
¬p qG G( ) memory, delay, feedback loop, controller (abstracted), filter 
(abstracted) 
73 645 4, 57·1018 126 
9 An inhibition signal is supposed to prevent actuation, but it does not.   
p qG( ) memory, delay 74 338 1, 29·1015 37,9 
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10 A delay logic is intended to return certain actuators to their normal position after a safety function actuation has successfully been carried out. However, the delay logic is 
automatically actuated at system initialisation.   
p qG O( ) delay 41 346 3, 21·1013 7,4 
aBMC was used, since analysis times otherwise exceeded several hours. 
bThe issue is used as an example in Section 3.5.           
Desc. Failed Elements Func. NuSMV Reachable Analysis   
property type in design blocks vars states time (s) 
11 A permissive signal can be set through maintenance actions, regardless of process state justification, by manually setting the state of a memory element. A function can then be 
actuated while it is supposed to be inhibited.   
p qG G( ) ( ) memory 27 171 2, 81·1013 0,6 
12 A permissive signal is set without the required operator acknowledgement if the process state justification for the permissive is valid at system initialisation. A function can then 
be actuated while it is supposed to be inhibited.   
p qG( ) memory 27 171 2, 81·1013 0,6 
13 Invalid (e.g., off-scale) measurements lead to an “open” command (as intended), but also to a simultaneous “close” command.   
p qG( ) memory, delay 146 29 4, 29·1011 0,2 
14 Contradicting measurements lead to an “open” command (as intended), but also to a simultaneous “close” command.   
¬ pG memory, delay 146 29 4, 29·1011 0,2 
15 Quick re-initialisation of a test by an operator, in combination with a very short signal pulse from an unrelated safety function, can interfere with the test sequence timing logic, 
and lead to actuation without need.   
p qG( ) memory, delay, feedback loop 93 399 1, 52·109 50,6 
16 Measurement signal validity, in combination with how hysteresis is applied to a limit criterion, can lead to actuation even if there has never been a valid measurement above/ 
below the limit.   
p qG O( ) memory 13 86 1, 07·108 0,2 
17 A startup sequence timing logic leaves the “start” command on for extended time, if the start criteria activate, the operator then resets the order, and the “start” command is then 
reactivated through (same or other) criterion.   
never {p[*n]} memory, delay 52 410 1, 11·1019 50,8 
18 A startup sequence timing logic leaves the “start” command on for extended time, if the start criteria activate, reset, and then reactivate with exactly the right timing.   
never {p[*n]} delay 52 300 9, 48·1017 140 
19c If the process criteria activate at the same cycle the operator presses reset, and the process criteria then reset at the same cycle the reset signal ends, the safety function remains 
actuated (while no longer justified by the measurements).   
p qG( ) memory 33 146 4, 29·1011 0,3 
20 A delay logic is intended to return certain actuators to their normal position after a safety function actuation has successfully been carried out. However, if the process criteria are 
set, then reset, and then again set with specific timing, both the “on” and “off” commands are activated simultaneously.   
never {p[*n]} delay 29 168 1, 67·1010 3,2 
21 A fluctuating process measurement causes a timing logic to enter a state where one measurement change is not accounted for (due to another signal setting a delay element), 
resulting in a command that the measurement no longer justifies.   
p q rG X X( ) delay 6 34 3 940 1,2 
cThe issue is used as an example in [17].  
References 
[1] Authén S, Bäckström O, Holmberg J, Porthin M, Tyrväinen T. NKS-361, Modelling 
of DIgital I&C, MODIG – Interim report 2015. NKS-R 361. NKS; 2016. 
[2] IAEA. Approaches for overall instrumentation and control architectures of nuclear 
power plants. Nuclear Energy Series NP-T-2.1. International Atomic Energy Agency; 
2018. http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/PUB1821_web.pdf. 
[3] MDEP. Common position on spurious actuation. Generic Common Position CP- 
DICWG-13. Multinational Design Evaluation Programme; 2018. https://www.oecd- 
nea.org/mdep/common-positions/cp-dicwg-13.pdf. 
[4] MDEP. Common position on hazard identification and controls for digital in-
strumentation and control systems. Generic Common Position DICWG-10. 
Multinational Design Evaluation Programme; 2016. https://www.oecd-nea.org/ 
mdep/common-positions/MDEP_GCP-DICWG-10_HazardIDandControl.pdf. 
[5] Bel VBfE, CNSC, CSN, ISTec, KAERI, KINS, NSC, ONR, SSM, STUK. Licensing of 
safety critical software for nuclear regulators, common position of international 
nuclear regulators and authorised technical support organisation. Common position 
Revision 2018. 2018. http://www.onr.org.uk/software.pdf. 
[6] IEC. Nuclear power plants – instrumentation and control important to safety – 
general requirements for systems. IEC Standard 61513:2011. International 
Electrotechnical Commission; 2011. 
[7] IAEA. Technical challenges in the application and licensing of digital in-
strumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants. Nuclear Energy Series 
NP-T-1.13. International Atomic Energy Agency; 2015. http://www-pub.iaea.org/ 
MTCD/Publications/PDF/P1695_web.pdf. 
[8] Heimdahl M, Choi Y, Whalen W. Deviation analysis: a new use of model checking. 
Automated Softw Engineering 2005;12(3):321–47. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 
s10515-005-2642-x. 
[9] Joshi A, Heimdahl MPE. Model-based safety analysis of Simulink models using 
SCADE design verifier. In: Winther R, Gran BA, Dahll G, editors. Computer Safety, 
Reliability, and Security Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg; 2005. p. 
122–35. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICRE.1998.667803. 
[10] Schneider F, Easterbrook SM, Callahan JR, Holzmann GJ. Validating requirements 
for fault tolerant systems using model checking. Proceedings of IEEE International 
Symposium on Requirements Engineering: RE ’98. 1998. p. 4–13. https://doi.org/ 
10.1109/ICRE.1998.667803. 
[11] Zhang M, Liu Z, Morisset C, Ravn AP. Design and verification of fault-tolerant 
components. In: Butler M, Jones C, Romanovsky A, Troubitsyna E, editors. Methods, 
Models and Tools for Fault Tolerance Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg; 2009. p. 57–84. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00867-2_4. 
[12] Bozzano M, Cimatti A, Katoen J-P, Katsaros P, Mokos K, Nguyen VY, et al. 
Spacecraft early design validation using formal methods. Reliability Engineering & 
System Safety 2014;132:20–35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2014.07.003. 
[13] Bernardeschi C, Fantechi A, Gnesi S. Model checking fault tolerant systems. 
Software Testing, Verification and Reliability 2002;12(4):251–75. https://doi.org/ 
10.1002/stvr.258. 
[14] Sharvia S, Papadopoulos Y. Integrating model checking with HiP-HOPS in model- 
based safety analysis. Reliability Engineering & System Safety 2015;135:64–80. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2014.10.025. 
[15] Clarke E, Grumber O, Peled D. Model checking. 2 Cambridge, Massachusetts, US: 
MIT press978-0-262-03270-4; 2001. 
[16] Pakonen A, Tahvonen T, Hartikainen M, Pihlanko M. Practical applications of 
model checking in the Finnish nuclear industry. 10th International Topical Meeting 
on Nuclear Plant Instrumentation, Control, and Human-Machine Interface 
Technologies (NPIC & HMIT). 2017. p. 1342–52. http://www.vtt.fi/inf/julkaisut/ 
muut/2017/OA-Practical_applications_of_model_checking.pdf. 
[17] Pakonen A, Björkman K. Model checking as a protective method against spurious 
actuation of industrial control systems. 27th European Safety and Reliability 
Conference (ESREL). 2017. p. 3189–96. https://cris.vtt.fi/files/23031295/ 
Pakonen_ESREL2017_Accepted_Manuscript.pdf. 
[18] Buzhinsky I, Pakonen A. Model-checking detailed fault-tolerant nuclear power plant 
safety functions. IEEE Access 2019;7:162139–56. https://doi.org/10.1109/ 
ACCESS.2019.2951938. 
[19] Cimatti A, Clarke E, Giunchiglia E, Giunchiglia F, Pistore M, Roveri M, et al. NuSMV 
2: An open source tool for symbolic model checking. In: Brinksma E, Larsen KG, 
editors. Computer Aided Verification. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg978-3-540-45657-5; 2002. p. 359–64. 
[20] Eisner C, Fisman D. A practical introduction to PSL. Springer US; 2006. https://doi. 
org/10.1007/978-0-387-36123-9. 
[21] Burch J, Clarke E, McMillan K, Dill D, Hwang L. Symbolic model checking: 
1020states and beyond. Information and Computation 1992;98(2):142–70. https:// 
doi.org/10.1016/0890-5401(92)90017-A. 
[22] Clarke E, Biere A, Raimi R, Zhu Y. Bounded model checking using satisfiability 
solving. Formal Methods in System Design 2001;19:7–34. https://doi.org/10.1023/ 
A:1011276507260. 
[23] Eén N, Sörensson N. Temporal induction by incremental SAT solving. Electron 
Notes Theor Comput Sci 2003;89(4):543–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1571- 
A. Pakonen, et al.   Reliability Engineering and System Safety 205 (2021) 107237
14
0661(05)82542-3. 
[24] Behrmann G, David A, Larsen KG. A Tutorial on Uppaal. Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg978-3-540-30080-9; 2004. p. 200–36. 
[25] Cimatti A, Griggio A, Mover S, Tonetta S. HyComp: An SMT-based model checker 
for hybrid systems. In: Baier C, Tinelli C, editors. Tools and Algorithms for the 
Construction and Analysis of Systems. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg978-3-662-46681-0; 2015. p. 52–67. 
[26] Lamport L. Proving the correctness of multiprocess programs. IEEE Trans Software 
Eng 1977;SE-3(2):125–43. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.1977.229904. 
[27] Benedetti M, Cimatti A. Bounded model checking for past LTL. In: Garavel H, 
Hatcliff J, editors. Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of 
Systems. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg978-3-540-36577-8; 2003. 
p. 18–33. 
[28] IEC. Property specification language. IEC Standard 62531:2012. International 
Electrotechnical Commission; 2012. 
[29] Pakonen A, Pang C, Buzhinsky I, Vyatkin V. User-friendly formal specification 
languages - conclusions drawn from industrial experience on model checking. 2016 
IEEE 21st International Conference on Emerging Technologies and Factory 
Automation (ETFA). 2016. p. 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1109/ETFA.2016.7733717. 
[30] Pradella M, San Pietro P, Spoletini P, Morzenti A. Practical model checking of LTL 
with past. International Workshop on Automated Technology for Verification and 
Analysis (ATVA03). 2003. 
[31] Dwyer M, Avrunin G, Corbett J. Patterns in property specifications for finite-state 
verification. Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Software 
Engineering. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing 
Machinery1581130740; 1999. p. 411–20. https://doi.org/10.1145/302405. 
302672. 
[32] Preuße S, Lapp H, Hanisch H. Closed-loop system modeling, validation, and ver-
ification. Proceedings of 2012 IEEE 17th International Conference on Emerging 
Technologies Factory Automation (ETFA 2012). 2012. p. 1–8. https://doi.org/10. 
1109/ETFA.2012.6489679. 
[33] Ramos AL, Ferreira JV, Barceló J. Model-based systems engineering: an emerging 
approach for modern systems. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 
Part C (Applications and Reviews) 2012;42(1):101–11. https://doi.org/10.1109/ 
TSMCC.2011.2106495. 
[34] Buzhinsky I, Pakonen A, Vyatkin V. Explicit-state and symbolic model checking of 
nuclear I&C systems: A comparison. IECON 2017 - 43rd Annual Conference of the 
IEEE Industrial Electronics Society. 2017. p. 5439–46. https://doi.org/10.1109/ 
IECON.2017.8216942. 
[35] STUK. Safety design of a nuclear power plant. YVL Guide B.1. Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority; 2013. https://www.stuklex.fi/en/ohje/YVLB-1. 
[36] Areva NP. U.S. EPR protection system. Technical Report ANP-10309NP. Areva NP; 
2012. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1216/ML121660317.html. 
[37] Areva NP. U.S. EPR application documents. Final Safety Analysis Report. Areva NP; 
2013. https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/design-cert/epr/reports.html. 
[38] Rolls-Royce. Spinline TM, a Rolls-Royce modular I&C digital platform dedicated to 
nuclear safety. Technical Sheet. Rolls-Royce; 2013. 
[39] Lahtinen J, Valkonen J, Björkman K, Frits J, Niemelä I, Heljanko K. Model checking 
of safety-critical software in the nuclear engineering domain. Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety 2012;105:104–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress. 
2012.03.021. 
[40] Pakonen A, Valkonen J, Matinaho S, Hartikainen M. Model checking for licensing 
support in the Finnish nuclear industry. International Symposium on Future I&C for 
Nuclear Power Plants (ISOFIC). 2014. 
[41] IEC. Programmable controllers – part 3: Programming languages. IEC Standard 
61131-3:2013. International Electrotechnical Commission; 2013. 
[42] Buzhinsky I, Pakonen A, Vyatkin V. Synthesis-aided reliability assurance of basic 
block models for model checking purposes. 2018 IEEE 27th International 
Symposium on Industrial Electronics (ISIE). 2018. p. 669–74. https://doi.org/10. 
1109/ISIE.2018.8433793. 
[43] Pakonen A, Buzhinsky I, Vyatkin V. Counterexample visualization and explanation 
for function block diagrams. 2018 IEEE 16th International Conference on Industrial 
Informatics (INDIN). 2018. p. 747–53. https://doi.org/10.1109/INDIN.2018. 
8472025. 
[44] Pakonen A, Mätäsniemi T, Lahtinen J, Karhela T. A toolset for model checking of 
PLC software. 2013 IEEE 18th Conference on Emerging Technologies Factory 
Automation (ETFA). 2013. p. 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1109/ETFA.2013.6648065. 
[45] Siemens. TELEPERM XS: A digital reactor protection system. Technical Report EMF- 
2110(NP)(A). Siemens; 2012. 
[46] Helminen A, Pakonen A. Potential applications of model checking in probabilistic 
risk assessments. VTT Technical Report VTT-R-00017-20. VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland Ltd.; 2020. https://cris.vtt.fi/files/27299692/VTT_R_00017_20. 
pdf. 
[47] Lahtinen J. Hardware failure modelling methodology for model checking. VTT 
Technical Report VTT-R-00213-14. VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd.; 
2014. https://www.vtt.fi/inf/julkaisut/muut/2014/VTT-R-00213-14.pdf. 
[48] Garcia I. Spurious actuations in digital instrumentation and control systems - eva-
luation framework. 10th International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Plant 
Instrumentation, Control, and Human-Machine Interface Technologies (NPIC & 
HMIT). 2017. p. 275–82. 
[49] Vaurio JK. Importance measures in risk-informed decision making: ranking, opti-
misation and configuration control. Reliability Engineering & System Safety 
2011;96(11):1426–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2011.06.012. 
[50] Jockenhövel-Barttfeld M, Taurines A, Hessler C. Quantification of application 
software failures of digital I&C in probabilistic safety analyses. Proceedings of 13th 
International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management 
(PSAM13). 2016. 
[51] Martorell S, Martorell P, Martón I, Sánchez A, Carlos S. An approach to address 
probabilistic assumptions on the availability of safety systems for deterministic 
safety analysis. Reliability Engineering & System Safety 2017;160:136–50. https:// 
doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2016.12.009. 
[52] Ovatman T, Aral A, Polat D, Ünver A. An overview of model checking practices on 
verification of PLC software. Softw & Systems Modeling 2016;15(4):937–60. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10270-014-0448-7. 
[53] Pavlovic O, Ehrich H. Model checking PLC software written in Function Block 
Diagram. 2010 Third International Conference on Software Testing, Verification 
and Validation. 2010. p. 439–48. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICST.2010.10. 
[54] Fernández Adiego B, Darvas D, Viñuela EB, Tournier J, Bliudze S, Blech JO, et al. 
Applying model checking to industrial-sized PLC programs. IEEE Trans Ind Inf 
2015;11(6):1400–10. https://doi.org/10.1109/TII.2015.2489184. 
[55] Cheng Pang, Vyatkin V. Automatic model generation of IEC 61499 function block 
using net condition/event systems. 2008 6th IEEE International Conference on 
Industrial Informatics. 2008. p. 1133–8. https://doi.org/10.1109/INDIN.2008. 
4618273. 
[56] Déharbe D, Shankar S, Clarke EM. Model checking VHDL with CV. In: 
Gopalakrishnan G, Windley P, editors. Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design. 
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg; 1998. p. 508–14. 
[57] Campos JC, Machado J. Pattern-based analysis of automated production systems. 
IFAC Proceedings Volumes 2009;42(4):972–7. https://doi.org/10.3182/20090603- 
3-RU-2001.0425. 13th IFAC Symposium on Information Control Problems in 
Manufacturing. 
[58] Autili M, Inverardi P, Pelliccione P. Graphical scenarios for specifying temporal 
properties: an automated approach. Automated Softw Engineering 
2017;14(3):293–340. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10515-007-0012-6. 
[59] Ljungkrantz O, Åkesson K, Fabian M, Ebrahimi A. An empirical study of control 
logic specifications for programmable logic controllers. Empirical Softw 
Engineering 2014;19(3):655–77. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10664-012-9232-x. 
[60] Yoo J, Cha S, Jee E. Verification of PLC programs written in FBD with VIS. 
Empirical Softw Engineering 2009;41(1):79–90. 
[61] Németh E, Bartha T. Formal verification of safety functions by reinterpretation of 
functional block based specifications. In: Cofer D, Fantechi A, editors. Formal 
Methods for Industrial Critical Systems. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg; 2009. p. 199–214. 
[62] Cavada R, Cimatti A, Dorigatti M, Griggio A, Mariotti A, Micheli A, et al. The 
nuXmv symbolic model checker. In: Biere A, Bloem R, editors. Computer Aided 
Verification. Cham: Springer International Publishing; 2014. p. 334–42. 
[63] IEC. Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA and FMECA). IEC Standard 60812. 
International Electrotechnical Commission; 2018. 
[64] IEC. Fault tree analysis (FTA). IEC Standard 61205:2006. International 
Electrotechnical Commission; 2006. 
[65] Bozzano M, Cimatti A, Lisagor O, Mattarei C, Mover S, Roveri M, et al. Safety as-
sessment of AltaRica models via symbolic model checking. Sci Comput Program 
2015;98:464–83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scico.2014.06.003. 
[66] Grunske L, Winter K, Yatapanage N, Zafar S, Lindsay PA. Experience with fault 
injection experiments for FMEA. Software: Practice and Experience 
2011;41(11):1233–58. https://doi.org/10.1002/spe.1039. 
[67] Molnár V, Majzik I. Model checking-based software-FMEA: assessment of fault 
tolerance and error detection mechanisms. Periodica Polytechnica Electrical 
Engineering and Computer Science 2017;61(2):132–50. https://doi.org/10.3311/ 
PPee.9755. 
[68] Aljazzar H, Fischer M, Grunske L, Kuntz M, Leitner-Fischer F, Leue S. Safety analysis 
of an airbag system using probabilistic FMEA and probabilistic counterexamples. 
2009 Sixth International Conference on the Quantitative Evaluation of Systems. 
2009. p. 299–308. https://doi.org/10.1109/QEST.2009.8.  
A. Pakonen, et al.   Reliability Engineering and System Safety 205 (2021) 107237
15
